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On Secrecy Capacity of Fast Fading MIMOME
Wiretap Channels With Statistical CSIT
Shih-Chun Lin and Cheng-Liang Lin
Abstract—In this paper, we consider secure transmissions
in ergodic Rayleigh fast-faded multiple-input multiple-output
multiple-antenna-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channels
with only statistical channel state information at the transmitter
(CSIT). When the legitimate receiver has more (or equal) anten-
nas than the eavesdropper, we prove the first MIMOME secrecy
capacity with partial CSIT by establishing a new secrecy capacity
upper-bound. The key step is to form an MIMOME degraded
channel by dividing the legitimate receiver’s channel matrix into
two submatrices, and setting one of the submatrices to be the
same as the eavesdropper’s channel matrix. Next, under the
total power constraint over all transmit antennas, we analytically
solve the channel-input covariance matrix optimization problem
to fully characterize the MIMOME secrecy capacity. Typically,
the MIMOME optimization problems are non-concave. However,
thank to the proposed degraded channel, we can transform the
stochastic MIMOME optimization problem to be a Schur-concave
one and then find its solution. Besides total power constraint,
we also investigate the secrecy capacity when the transmitter is
subject to the practical per-antenna power constraint. The cor-
responding optimization problem is even more difficult since it is
not Schuar-concave. Under the two power constraints considered,
the corresponding MIMOME secrecy capacities can both scale
with the signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) when the difference between
numbers of antennas at legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
are large enough. However, when the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper have a single antenna each, such SNR scalings do
not exist for both cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Key-based enciphering is a well-adopted technique to ensure
the security in current data transmission system. However, for
secure communications in wireless networks, the distributions
and managements of secret keys may be challenging tasks [1].
The physical-layer security introduced in [2] [3] is appealing
due to its keyless nature. The basic building block of physical-
layer security is the so-called wiretap channel. In this channel,
a source node wants to transmit confidential messages securely
to a legitimate receiver and to keep the eavesdropper as
ignorant of the message as possible. Wyner [3] character-
ized the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap
channel, in which the secret key was not used. The secrecy
capacity is the largest secrecy rate of communication between
the source and the destination nodes with the eavesdropper
knowing no information of the messages. In order to meet
the demands of high data rate transmissions and improve the
connectivities of the secure networks [4], the multiple antenna
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systems with security concerns are considered by several
authors. In [5], the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian channel with
two-input, two-output, single-antenna-eavesdropper was first
characterized. This result was extended by [6], in which the
secrecy capacities of general Gaussian multiple-input multiple-
output multiple-antenna-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels
are proved. In wireless environments, with perfect knowledge
of the legitimate receiver’s channel state information at the
transmitter (CSIT), the time-varying characteristic of fading
eavesdropper channels can be further exploited to enhance the
secrecy [7]–[10].
However, to attain the secrecy capacity results in [5]–[7],
at least the perfect knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s
CSIT is required. For the fast fading channels, it may be hard
to track the rapidly varying channel coefficients because of
the limited feedback bandwidth and the delay caused by the
channel estimation. Thus for fast-fading channels, it is more
practical to consider the case with only partial CSIT of the
legitimate channel. For the setting where only statistical CSIT
of both legitimate and eavesdropper channels is available, the
secrecy capacity is only rigorously characterized for multiple-
input single-output single-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOSE)
Rayleigh fast-faded channels [11]. A negative phenomenon,
revealed in [11], showed that for the MISOSE channels with
only statistical CSIT, the secrecy capacities would neither scale
with the number of transmit antennas nor the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). Thus using multiple transmitter antennas in the
MISOSE system limitedly helps increase the secrecy capacity,
compared with the system using single transmitter antenna.
In this paper, we want to overcome the aforementioned
drawbacks of the MISOSE system. We then focus on the
MIMOME fast Rayleigh-faded channels where the trans-
mitter only have the statistical CSIT of the legitimate and
eavesdropper channels. Two different power constraints are
considered. One is the total power constraint over all transmit
antennas, and the other is the more practical per-antenna power
constraint. Under the total power constraint over all transmit
antennas, the MIMOME secrecy capacity is characterized
when antennas of the legitimate receiver are more than (or
equal to) those of the eavesdropper. To the best of the au-
thor’s knowledge, this is the first MIMOME secrecy capacity
result with partial CSIT. Compared with our previous works
[11], new proof techniques are developed for the MIMOME
channels. First, we establish a new secrecy capacity upper-
bound by dividing the channel matrix of legitimate receiver
into two submatrices, one of the submatrices has dimensions
equal to those of the eavesdropper’s channel matrix, to form
an MIMOME degraded channel. Second, instead of using
2completely monotone property as [11], which may only exists
for the MISOSE problem, we solve the stochastic MIMOME
optimization problem by transforming it to an equivalent
Schur-concave problem. The key to this transformation is
using the proposed equivalent MIMOME degraded channel.
According to our secrecy capacity results, on the contrary to
[11], we observe that the SNR scaling of secrecy capacity can
be obtained in the MIMOME channels when the number of
antenna of the legitimate receiver is larger than (but not equal
to) that of the eavesdropper. Also when the number of transmit
antennas is fixed, increasing the difference between numbers
of antennas of legitimate receiver and eavesdropper helps to
increase the secrecy capacities.
For the cases where the transmitters are subject to the prac-
tical per-antenna power constraints, we also fully characterize
the secrecy capacities for the MISOSE wiretap channels with
statistical CSIT. Because the optimization problem subject
to the per-antenna power constraint is not Schur-concave,
only numerical algorithm is developed to find the secrecy
capacity for the MIMOME channel. However, we can still
show that under this constraint, when there are sufficient
transmit antennas with large enough transmitted power each,
the MIMOME secrecy capacities can also scale with SNRs.
Such a scaling cannot be obtained for the MISOSE wiretap
channels under per-antenna power constraint, even when all
transmit antennas are allowed to transmit with large power.
Under total power constraint over all transmit antennas,
several works have studied the secrecy capacities in various
channel settings. For channels with full CSIT, the secrecy
capacities were found in [5], [6]; and for ergodic slow fading
channels with partial CSIT, they were found in [7]. However,
for fast fading channels with full legitimate CSIT and statis-
tical eavesdropper CSIT, the secrecy capacities are unknown.
And several works instead studied the achievable secrecy rate
in these channels [8]–[10]. The settings in [5]–[10] are funda-
mentally different to ours. In this paper, fast fading channels
with only statistical CSIT of both legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper are considered. Our works are the first secrecy
capacity results for MIMOME channels with statistical CSIT.
More related works and the comparisons with our works can
be found in our MISOSE previous work [11] and references
within. Subject to the per-antenna power constraint, secrecy
rate optimization with full CSIT was studied in [12]. Besides
the difference between CSIT assumptions compared to ours,
the channel input matrix in [12] was optimized numerically
and the optimality was not guaranteed. However, in our work,
optimal channel input covariance matrix for the MISOSE
channel is analytically solved, and our numerical algorithm
for the MIMOME channel can guarantee the optimality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we introduce the considered system model. In Section III,
under total power constraint over all tranmitter antennas, we
prove the secrecy capacities for fast fading MIMOME wiretap
channels with statistical CSIT. In Section IV, we investigate
secrecy capacities under per-antenna power constraints. Sim-
ulation results are provided in Section V, and the conclusion
is given in Section VI.
Notations: In this paper, lower and upper case bold al-
phabets denote vectors and matrices, respectively. The zero-
mean complex Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
Σ is denoted as CN(0,Σ). The mutual information between
two random vectors x and y is I(x;y), while the conditional
differential entropy is h(x|y). The superscript (.)H denotes
the transpose complex conjugate. |A| and |a| represent the
determinant of the square matrix A and the absolute value
of the scalar variable a, respectively. The trace of A is
denoted by tr(A). The element of A in the ith row and jth
column is {A}i, j. A diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are
a1 . . .ak is denoted by diag(a1 . . .ak). The positive semidefinite
ordering between Hermitian matrices A and B are denoted
by A  B (A ≻ B), where A−B is a positive semi-definite
(definite) matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the considered MIMOME wiretap channel, we study
the problem of reliably communicating a secret message w
from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver, subject to a
constraint on the information attainable by the eavesdropper
(in upcoming (6)). The transmitter has nt antennas, while the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper respectively have nr and
ne antennas as
y = Hx+ny, (1)
z = Gx+nz, (2)
where x ∈ Cnt×1 represents the transmitted vector signal; the
legitimate channel matrix is H ∈ Cnr×nt while the eavesdrop-
per channel matrix is G ∈ Cne×nt ; ny and nz are additive
white Gaussian noise vectors at the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper, respectively, with each element independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.), circularly symmetric, and having
zero mean and unit variance. The channels are assumed to be
fast Rayleigh fading, that is, each element of H and G is i.i.d
distributed as
CN(0,σ2h) and CN(0,σ2g), (3)
respectively, while the channel coefficients change in each
symbol time. The H, G, ny and nz are independent. We assume
that the legitimate receiver knows the instantaneous channel
state information of H perfectly, while the eavesdropper knows
those of H and G perfectly. As for the CSIT, only the
distributions of H and G are known while the realizations
of H and G are unknown at the transmitter.
In this work, we consider two kinds of constraints for the
channel input x. The first one is the total power constraint over
all transmitter antennas as
Tr(Σx)≤ P, (4)
where Σx is the covariance matrix of x. Note that under (4), the
transmitter can perform power allocation between transmitter
antennas to increase the secrecy capacity. In addition to (4),
we also consider a more practical per-antenna constraint for
the transmitter antennas as
{Σx}ii ≤ Pi, (5)
3for i = 1, . . . ,nt . Note that the per-antenna constraint (5)
is more stringent than the total power constraint (4) when
ΣNti=1Pi ≤ P.
The perfect secrecy and the corresponding secrecy capacity
are defined as follows. Consider a (2NR,N)-code with an
encoder that maps the message w ∈WN = {1,2, . . . ,2NR} into
a length-N codeword, and a decoder at the legitimate receiver
that maps the received sequence yN (the collections of y
over the code length N) from the legitimate channel (1) to
an estimated message wˆ ∈ WN . We then have the following
definitions, where zN , HN , and GN are the collections of z, H,
and G over the code length N, respectively.
Definition 1 (Secrecy Capacity [1] [3] [7]): Perfect
secrecy is achievable with rate R if, for any ε > 0, there exists
a sequence of (2NR,N)-codes and an integer N0 such that for
any N > N0
Re = h(w|zN ,HN ,GN)/N ≥ R− ε, (6)
and Pr(wˆ 6= w)≤ ε,
where Re in (6) is the equivocation rate and w is the
secret message. The secrecy capacity is the supremum of all
achievable secrecy rates.
Note that the perfect secrecy requirement in (6) is measured
by I(w;zN ,HN ,GN)/N = R− Re, which is based on all the
observations (zN ,HN ,GN) the eavesdropper has.
From Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s seminal work [2], we know that
the secrecy capacity of MIMOME channel (1) and (2) is
max
U
I(U ;y,H)− I(U ;z,H,G),
=max
U
I(U ;y|H)− I(U ;z|H,G), (7)
where U is an auxiliary random variable satisfying the Markov
relationship U → x → (y,H),(z,H,G), and (7) results from
the fact that the transmitter does not have the knowledge of
the realizations of H and G. However, the optimal choice
of U which maximizes the secrecy capacity of considered
fast fading MIMOME channel is unknown. In this paper,
we want to fully characterize the optimal U . Note that the
secrecy capacity considered here is achieved by encoding over
multiple channel states and the perfect secrecy constraint must
be satisfied for all N >N0. This implies that no secrecy outage
[13] [9] is allowed. In delay-limited applications, such perfect
secrecy condition may not be achievable and, thus, a tradeoff
exists between secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
These issues have been discussed in [13] [9] and are beyond
the scope of this paper.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY UNDER THE
TOTAL POWER CONSTRAINT
In this section, we explicitly find the optimal U in (7) for
wiretap channel (1)(2), and fully characterize the MIMOME
secrecy capacity with statistical CSIT in the upcoming Theo-
rem 1. When there is full CSIT [6], one can find the optimal
auxiliary random variable U by constructing an equivalent
degraded MIMOME channel to upper-bound the secrecy ca-
pacity. However, with only statistical CSIT, if one naively
applies the degraded channel construction method in [6], the
resulting secrecy capacity upper bound will depend on the
realizations of (H,G) and become very loose. Thus in general
it is very hard to find the optimal U maximizing (7)
Due to the difficulty mentioned in the previous paragraph,
with statistical CSIT, finding the optimal U maximizing (7) is
very hard in general. However, in the following Lemma, for
the special cases where the MIMOME channels are Rayleigh
faded as (3), we show that one may still construct a de-
graded channel for upper-bounding and find the optimal U
maximizing (7). The key for building this equivalent degraded
MIMOME channel for (1)(2) is replacing the legitimate chan-
nel H with equivalent H′ in upcoming (9) as follows. When
nr ≥ ne, one can divide the legitimate channel matrix H in (1)
as two submatrices
H = [HT(nr−ne) H
T
ne
]T , (8)
where H(nr−ne) ∈ C
(nr−ne)×nt and Hne ∈ Cne×nt , with each
element of H(nr−ne) and Hne distributed as i.i.d. Gaussian
CN(0,σ2h). From the properties of complex Gaussian distri-
butions, the distribution of H is the same as that of
H′ = [HT(nr−ne)
(
σh
σg
)
GT ]T , (9)
because each element of eavesdropper channel matrix G is
distributed as CN(0,σ2g) according to (3). With (9), one can
build an equivalent degraded MIMOME channel for (1)(2) (see
upcoming (10) (12)), where the received signal at eavesdropper
can be treated as a degraded version of that at the legitimate
receiver. Then we can obtain a tight secrecy capacity upper
bound and have the following property of the optimal U for
(7).
Lemma 1: For the MIMOME fast Rayleigh fading wiretap
channel (1)(2) with the statistical CSIT of H and G,
using Gaussian x without prefixing U ≡ x is the optimal
transmission strategy for (7) under (4) when nr ≥ ne and
σh ≥ σg, where nr and ne respectively are the number of
antennas at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, while
σh and σg respectively are the variances of the legitimate and
eavesdropper channels as (3).
Proof: We first form the degraded MIMOME channel
with respect to (1)(2). Here we will only consider the cases
where σ2g > 0, since the case with σ2g = 0 is a trivial one which
corresponds to channel without eavesdropper. Note that H in
(8) has the same distribution as H′ in (9). Then we can form
an equivalent received signal
y′ = H′x+ny, (10)
which has the same marginal distribution as the legitimate
received signal y in (1). Now, rewrite the above y′ using (9)
as
y′ = [HT(nr−ne)
(
σh
σg
)
GT ]T x+ny
=
[(
y′(nr−ne)
)T (
y′ne
)T]T
, (11)
4where y′(nr−ne) ∈C
(nr−ne)×1 and y′ne ∈C
ne×1
. Now we consider
σg
σh
y′ =
[
σg
σh
(
y′(nr−ne)
)T
(Gx+(σg/σh)ny,ne)
T
]T
,
where the noise vector ny,ne ∈ Cne×1 comes from divid-
ing the noise vector at the legitimate receiver as ny =
[nTy,(nr−ne) n
T
y,ne ]
T
. From (2), it is clear that when σh ≥ σg,
we have the markov relationship that given H′
x→
σg
σh
y′→ z. (12)
The degraded MIMOME wiretap channel (x,(σg/σh)y′,z) is
then formed.
Now based on the proposed degraded channel
(x,(σg/σh)y′,z), we know that the secrecy capacity is
upper-bounded by
C ts ≤max
x
I(x;
σg
σh
y′|H′)− I(x;z|G), (13)
= max
x
I(x;y|H)− I(x;z|G), (14)
where the inequality follows [11], with the right-hand-side
(RHS) being the secrecy capacity of our degraded channel but
forcing the eavesdropper knowing (z,G) instead of (z,H′,G);
and the equality comes from that (y′,H′) and (y,H) have the
same distributions. From [2], we also know that the RHS
of (14) is achievable. Thus the RHS of (14) is the secrecy
capacity C ts . Furthermore, from [6], we know that Gaussian x
is optimal for the secrecy capacity in (14) under total power
constraint (4). Then our claim is valid.
Note that on the contrary to the upper-bound with full CSIT
in [6], our secrecy capacity upper bound (13) is independent
of the realizations of H and G. This is why our bounds
are tight for MIMOME channels with only statistical CSIT.
Compared to the proof for the MISOSE secrecy capacity
[11], the key for deriving the tight MIMOME upper-bound is
separating the legitimate channel matrix H by two submatrices
H(nr−ne) and Hne as (8), and only introducing correlations
between Hne and G as (9). One can treat the unchanged
submatrix H(nr−ne) as a “safe” channel matrix without being
eavesdropped, which provides SNR scaling for the secrecy
capacity. In MISOSE channel, such a H(nr−ne) does not exist
because nr = ne = 1, and there is no SNR scaling. This
intuition is verified rigorously from the upcoming Theorem
1 and Corollary 1.
Now we fully characterize the MIMOME secrecy capacity
based on Lemma 1. Typically, the MIMOME secrecy capac-
ity optimization problems like the upcoming (16) are non-
concave. This is due to that the MIMOME secrecy capacities,
such as (16), are a difference of two concave functions. How-
ever, with aids of the degraded MIMOME channels formed
by (9), the stochastic MIMOME optimization problem (16)
can be transformed to be a Schur-concave problem. This
transformation helps a lot to find the optimal solution (17).
Note that the completely monotone property for MISOSE
optimization problem [11] may not exist for the MIMOME
one, and thus the method in [11] is hard to be extended to the
MIMOME cases.
Theorem 1: Under the total power constraint
Tr(Σx)≤ P, (15)
the MIMOME secrecy capacity C ts when nr ≥ ne and σh ≥ σg
is
max
Σx
(
EH
[
log
∣∣∣I+HΣxH†∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+GΣxG†∣∣∣]) , (16)
and the optimal channel input covariance matrix subject to
(15) is
Σ∗x =
P
nt
I. (17)
Proof: First we show that under our setting, subject to
(15), the stochastic MIMOME optimization problem (16) can
be transformed to an equivalent concave problem. The key
is cleverly using the same marginal channel formed by (9).
Note that the objective function in (16) can be rewritten as
I(x;y|H)− I(x;z|G) with x∼CN(0,Σx) as
I(x;y|H)− I(x;z|G) (a)=I(x; σg
σh
y′|H′)− I(x;z|G),
(b)
=I(x;
σg
σh
y′|z,H′), (18)
and then from [6], we know that the RHS of (18 b) is concave
in Σx. The (18 a) comes from (14), while (18 b) comes from
(9) and the fact that
I(x;
σg
σh
y′|H′)− I(x;z|G)
(a)
=I(x;
σg
σh
y′,z|H(nr−ne),G)− I(x;z|H(nr−ne),G),
(b)
=I(x;
σg
σh
y′|z,H(nr−ne),G). (19)
In the above, (19 a) comes from that
I(x;
σg
σh
y′|H′) = I(x;
σg
σh
y′,z|H(nr−ne),G),
and I(x;z|G) = I(x;z|H(nr−ne),G),
with the former resulting from (9) and the Markov relationship
(12) and the latter resulting from the independence of H(nr−ne)
with (x,z,G); while (19 b) comes from the chain rule of the
mutual information [14].
After showing that (16) can be transformed to an equivalent
concave problem, now we show that (16) can be further
transformed to a symmetric optimization problem. Then we
can explore the Schuar-concavity of the secrecy capacity (16)
to show that the optimal Σx =αI where 0≤ α≤ P/nt . For any
non-diagonal Σx, we can apply the eigenvalue decomposition
on it as Σx = UDU†, where U is unitary and D is diagonal.
Then for the objective function in (16), setting Σx = UDU†
and Σx = D will result in the same value since H and G are
Rayleigh distributed as (3). Also the total power constraint
(15) can be transformed as
Tr
(
UDU†
)
= Tr
(
U†UD
)
= Tr(D)≤ P. (20)
5In the following, we then focus on the following optimization
problem instead
max
D
(
EH
[
log
∣∣∣I+HDH†∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+GDG†∣∣∣]) , (21)
where the diagonal matrix D satisfying (20). Because H and
G are Rayleigh faded as (3), (21) is symmetric for D. That is,
all permutations of the diagonal terms of D will result in the
same value for the objective function in (21). Together with
the fact that (21) is concave as shown previously, we know
that the objective function (21) is Schur-concave. Subject to
the constraint Tr(D)≤P, from [15], it can be easily shown that
the optimal D (and thus Σx) is αI where 0 ≤ α ≤ P/nt . This
result comes from the fact that the diagonal entries {α, . . . ,α}
are majorized by any other diagonal entries {d1, . . . ,dnt} of D
if 1
nt
∑nti=1 di =α, and properties of the Schur-concave function
[15].
Finally, we will show that using all available power, that
is, Σx = (P/nt)I is optimal for (16). To do this, we will first
show an important property of the objective function in (16)
with respect to the matrix partial ordering as in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2: For the objective function of the optimization
problem in (16),
Rs(Σx), EH
[
log
∣∣∣I+HΣxH†∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+GΣxG†∣∣∣] , (22)
we have the following properties when nr ≥ ne and σh ≥ σg
(I) If two channel input covariance matrices satisfy Σ2x  Σ1x 
0, then
Rs(Σ2x)≥ Rs(Σ1x). (23)
(II) If Σ1x ≻ 0, then Rs(Σ1x)> 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A, which results
from the equivalent degraded MIMOME channels described
in the proof of Lemma 1. As aforementioned, we know the
optimal Σx = αI for (16) subject to (15). Now we can show
that α = P/nt is optimal for (16) using Lemma 2 as follows.
Let us substitute Σx = αI into the objective function in (16),
it becomes
EH
[
log
∣∣∣I+αHH†∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+αGG†∣∣∣]=C(α), (24)
where 0≤ α≤ P/nt . If α > 0, we know that
(P/nt)I  αI ≻ 0.
Then from Property (I) of Lemma 2, we know that C(P/nt)≥
C(α) for any α > 0. As for the case α = 0, we know that
C(0) = 0 from (24). However, if α > 0, we have C(α) > 0
from Property (II) of Lemma 2. Then we know that
C(P/nt)≥C(α)>C(0),
for any α > 0. Thus α = P/nt is optimal for (24). It concludes
our proof.
Remark: Note that in the final step of Theorem 1’s proof,
we show that the optimal channel input covariance matrix
happens when the total power constraint in (15) is met with
equality. This fact is not always true for the wiretap channel
and counter examples are given [16] [8]. When the transmit
power increases, both the SNRs at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper increase. Then the secrecy capacity may not
always be maximized with using all available power. Indeed,
this property was also examined in [10]. However, in [10],
the perfect CSIT of the legitimate receiver is assumed to be
available, which is fundamentally different to our setting.
Now we have the following result which characterizes the
secrecy capacity in Theorem 1 with respect to the number of
antennas (nt ,nr,ne) at the transmitter, legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper respectively. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Corollary 1: Under total power constraint (15), we have
the following asymptotic results for the MIMOME secrecy
capacity C ts as
lim
Pg→∞
C ts − nr log(σ2h/σ2g)
logPg
=


nr− ne, nt ≥ nr > ne
nt − ne, nr ≥ nt > ne
0, nr ≥ ne ≥ nt
when σh ≥ σg > 0, where Pg = σ2gP is the equivalent received
SNR at the eavesdropper.
In [11], it was shown that when nr = ne = 1, the secrecy
capacity does not scale with P. Our Corollary 1 shows that
to make secrecy capacity scale with P, we must let nr − ne
larger than (but not equal to) zero. Also adding enough number
of transmit antennas to make nt > ne is very important for
increasing the secrecy capacity. Indeed, from our numerical
results in Section V, with fixed nt > ne, increasing the dif-
ference nr − ne will help to increase the secrecy capacities
for all SNR regimes (besides the high SNR regime proved in
Corollary 1).
From Property (II) of Lemma 2, the secrecy capacity
in Theorem 1 is always positive when P > 0, nr ≥ ne and
σh > σg. It will also be interesting to see when the secrecy
capacity is zero. We have the following result, where the
proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 and neglected.
Corollary 2: For the MIMOME fast Rayleigh fading wire-
tap channel (1)(2) with the statistical CSIT of H and G, the
secrecy capacity is zero when nr ≤ ne and σh ≤ σg.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY UNDER THE
PER-ANTENNA POWER CONSTRAINT
After investigating the MIMOME secrecy capacity C ts
under the total power constraint over all transmitter antennas,
now we consider the MIMOME channel under the more
practical per-antenna power constraint. First, we show
that the MIMOME secrecy capacity under the per-antenna
power constraint can be expressed as the following convex
optimization problem, with proof given in Appendix C.
6Proposition 1: Under the per-antenna power constraint
{Σx}ii ≤ Pi, (25)
i = 1, . . . ,nt , when nr ≥ ne and σh ≥ σg > 0, the MIMOME
secrecy capacity Cps is
max
Σx
(
EH
[
log
∣∣∣I+HΣxH†∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+GΣxG†∣∣∣]) , (26)
which can be transformed to a concave optimization problem
subject to (25) as
max
Σx
(
EG,H(nr−ne)
[
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+Σx
(
H†(nr−ne)H(nr−ne)+
σ2h
σ2g
G†G
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
−EG
[
log
∣∣∣I+GΣxG†∣∣∣]
)
, (27)
where G is the eavesdropper channel matrix and H(nr−ne) is
the sub-matrix of the legitimate channel as defined in (9).
Unlike the optimization in Theorem 1, subject to (25), the
optimal Σx of problem (26) is very hard to find analytically
for general nr. The main difficulty is that the per-antenna
power constraint (25) is not symmetric. Note that (25) is
related to eigenvectors of Σx, while the total power constraint
(15) (Tr{Σx}) is independent of these eigenvectors. Thus
although the total power constraint can be transformed
to (20) via the eigenvalue decomposition of Σx, the same
technique cannot be applied to the per-antenna constraint
(15). Thus we only claim that the problem (26) subject to
(25) can be transformed to a concave one as (27), but not the
Schuar-concave one as in the proof of Theorem 1. Lack of
symmetry in constraint (25) makes finding analytical solution
of it difficult. Nevertheless, we still have the following result
for the structure of the optimal Σ∗x in Proposition 1 as
Proposition 2: Under the per-antenna power constraint
{Σx}ii ≤ Pi, i = 1, . . . ,nt , when nr ≥ ne and σh ≥ σg, there
exists an optimal channel input covariance matrix Σ∗x for the
MIMOME secrecy capacity optimization problem (26) which
satisfies
{Σ∗x}ii = Pi, i = 1, . . . ,nt , (28)
that is, each antenna should fully use its available power.
Proof: We will prove it by showing that if there exists
an optimal Σx which does not meet (28), one can find another
Σ∗x meeting (28) and having the same optimal value. Suppose
that there exists an optimal Σx maximizing (26) which has
some diagonal terms using powers smaller than their maxi-
mum available powers. We collect the indexes corresponding
to these diagonal terms as a non-empty set Is 6= ∅, i.e.,
{Σx}ii < Pi, if i ∈ Is ⊆ {1, . . . ,nt}. Then we can form another
Σ∗x as
{Σ∗x}i j =
{
Pi if i = j and i ∈ Is,
{Σx}i j otherwise.
Then we know that Σ∗x−Σx ≻ 0, because Σ∗x−Σx is a diagonal
matrix with |Is| positive diagonal terms, while the other
diagonal terms are zero. Note that the size of set Is meets
|Is|> 0 and at least one diagonal terms of Σ∗x−Σx is positive.
Then from Property (I) of Lemma 2 we know that for the
objective function Rs(.) in (26), Rs(Σ∗x)≥ Rs(Σx). Since Σx is
assumed to be optimal, Rs(Σx) ≥ Rs(Σ∗x), and then we know
that Rs(Σ∗x) = Rs(Σx).
Although for general nr, we only can obtain the above
property for the optimization problem in Proposition 1, due
to the aforementioned difficulty below Proposition 1. For the
special MISOSE case nr = ne = 1, we can have the following
secrecy capacity result as in the upcoming Theorem. The key
proof steps come as follows. First, we use (27) in Proposition
1 to transform the objective function in (26) into a simpler one
as in the upcoming (30). And then we can apply Proposition 2
and properties of random Gaussian vectors to obtain analytical
solutions.
Theorem 2: Subject to the per-antenna power constraints
{Σx}ii ≤ Pi, i = 1, . . . ,nt , the secrecy capacity optimization
problem (27) has optimal channel input covariance matrix
Σ∗x = diag(P1,P2, . . . ,Pnt ) (29)
for the MISOSE wiretap channel, where the legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper has single antenna each nr = ne = 1.
Proof: For this special case nr = ne = 1, the sub-matrix
of the legitimate channel H(nr−ne) in (27) does not exist. Then
the optimization problem in (27) can be rewritten as
max
Σx
(
Eg
[
log
σ2g/σ
2
h + g†Σxg
σ2g/σ
2
h
]
−Eg
[
log(1+ g†Σxg)
])
,
=max
Σx
(
Eg
[
log
(
1+
σ2g/σ
2
h− 1
1+ g†Σxg
)])
+log
(
σ2h/σ
2
g
)
, (30)
where for clearness, we replace the notation G in (27) with
g† ∼ CN(0,σ2gI) to emphasize that the eavesdropper channel
is now a vector when nr = 1. Note that the objective function
in (30) is only related to the channel vector g for the eaves-
dropper, but not the channel vector for the legitimate receiver.
The above transformations make finding analytical solutions
possible.
Next, from Proposition 2, without loss of optimality, one can
replace the inequality constraint (25) by the equality constraint
on the diagonal entries of Σx as
{Σx}ii = Pi, (31)
for i = 1, . . . ,nt . Now we show that for any β ≤ 0, σ > 0,
β+2σ> 0, subject to equality constraint (31), the optimization
problem
max
Σx
(
Eg
[
log
(
1+ β
σ+ g†Σxg
)])
(32)
has optimal solution (29). This fact is proved in Appendix D,
where the key step is cleverly applying properties of random
Gaussian vectors. Note that the objective function in (30) is
a special case of that in (32) with β = σ2g/σ2h− 1 and σ = 1.
And then subject to (25), the optimal Σx maximizing (27) (and
the the original (26)) with nr = ne = 1 is (29). Our claim in
Theorem 2 is valid.
7Here we investigate the SNR scaling of the MISOSE chan-
nel under the per-antenna power constrains. From Theorem 2,
we have
Corollary 3: Under the per-antenna power constraint
{Σx}ii≤Pi, i= 1, . . . ,nt , when nr = ne = 1 and σh ≥σg > 0, we
have the following asymptotic results for the MISOSE secrecy
capacity Cps as
lim
Pgmax→∞
Cps − log(σ2h/σ2g)
logPgmax
= 0, (33)
where Pgmax = σ2gPmax with
Pmax , max
i=1,...nt
Pi (34)
being the maximum among per-antenna power constraints.
Proof: As (22), let us denote the objective function of
optimization problem (26) as Rs(Σx). From the Property (I) of
Lemma 2, we know that the MISOSE secrecy capacity under
the per-antenna power constraint Cps =Rs(diag{P1, . . . ,Pnt})≤
Rs(diag{Pmax, . . . ,Pmax}). This fact is due to that
diag{Pmax, . . . ,Pmax}  diag{P1, . . . ,Pnt}  0,
because diag{Pmax, . . . ,Pmax}−diag{P1, . . . ,Pnt} is a diagonal
matrix with non-negative entries from (34). By Theorem 1 we
know that Rs(diag{Pmax, . . . ,Pmax}) is the MISOSE secrecy
capacity under total power constraint Tr(Σx) ≤ ntPmax. Then
by Corollary 1, for fixed nt , (33) is valid since nr = ne = 1.
From Corollary 3, we know that the multiple transmitter
antennas for the MISOSE channel limitedly help to increase
the secrecy capacity under the per-antenna power constraint.
Indeed, note that (33) is hold even when only one transmitter
antenna, which has the maximum power constraint, is selected
to transmit secret messages while the other ones are silent.
In this case, the per-antenna power constraint corresponding
to (25) are Pi = Pmax and Pj = 0, j 6= i,∀ j, where the ith
transmitter antenna is selected. When SNR is large enough,
the secrecy rate for this simple transmitter antenna selection
scheme [17] is within constant gap compared with the secrecy
capacity where all transmitter antennas are used.
To overcome the negative results for MISOSE channels
revealed in Corollary 3, as in Section III, we now show that
making the difference between numbers of antennas at the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper nr − ne > 0 will help to
increase the secrecy capacity under the per-antenna power con-
straint. Although we cannot find the optimal Σx for (26) subject
to (25), we use the following sub-optimal Σx to compute the
secrecy capacity lower bound as Σx = diag(P1,P2, . . . ,Pnt ).
This selection of Σx is optimal for the MISOSE case from
Theorem 2, and for the MIMOME case, this selection is also
reasonable due to Proposition 2. Now we have the following
result for the secrecy capacity in Proposition 1 as
Corollary 4: Under the per-antenna power constraint
{Σx}ii ≤ Pi, i = 1, . . . ,nt , when σh ≥ σg > 0, we have the
following asymptotic result for the MIMOME secrecy capacity
Cps as
lim
Pgmin→∞
Cps − nr log(σ2h/σ2g)
logPgmin
≥
{
nr− ne, nt ≥ nr > ne
nt − ne, nr ≥ nt > ne,
(35)
where Pgmin = σ2gPmin with
Pmin , min
i=1,...nt
Pi (36)
is the minimum among per-antenna power constraints.
Proof: From the definition of Pmin in (36), we know that
diag{P1, . . . ,Pnt}  diag{Pmin, . . . ,Pmin} ≻ 0.
Then we know that Cps ≥ Rs(diag{P1, . . . ,Pnt}) ≥
Rs(diag{Pmin, . . . ,Pmin}), where the second inequality
comes from Property (I) of Lemma 2. By Theorem 1 we
know that Rs(diag{Pmin, . . . ,Pmin}) is the MIMOME secrecy
capacity under total power constraint Tr(Σx) ≤ ntPmin. Then
by Corollary 1, for fixed nt , (35) is valid.
From (35), as discussions under Corollary 1, adding enough
number of legitimate-receiver antennas nr (also enough num-
ber of transmit antennas nt) is very important for increasing the
secrecy capacity Cps . Moreover, (35) also reveals some antenna
selection rules for MIMOME wiretap channel under the per-
antenna power constraint. For example, when nt > nr > ne,
the transmitter can select the largest nr antennas to transmit
the secret message. Each selected antenna transmits with all
its allowable power. When the allowable power of all selected
antenna is high enough, this simple transmit antenna selection
scheme can achieve good secrecy rate performance according
to (35).
Finally, we develop algorithms to solve the MIMOME
secrecy capacity optimization problems (26) subject to the per-
antenna power constraint (25). To do this, as in Proposition
1, by using the same marginal channel matrix H′ in (9), we
first transfer the stochastic optimization problem (26) into a
concave one (27). Next, from Proposition 2, one can set the
inequalities in constraints (25) with equalities as (28) to further
simplify the problem. Then we can use algorithms similar to
those in [18] to find the optimal values for (26) by matrix
calculus [19] [20]. The gap to the optimal value is within
nt/t, where nt is the number of transmit antenna and t > 0
is a parameter to prevent the algorithm approaching non-
semidefine Σx. Note that our problem can not be simplified
by the multiple-access-channels-broadcast-channels duality as
[18]. Though wiretap channels are similar to the broadcast
channels, there may be no corresponding dualities for the
wiretap channels.
Here comes the reformulation of the secrecy capacity opti-
mization problem (26) subject to (25) for our algorithm. First,
we use the following objective function as
ft (Σx) = ˜Rs(Σx)+ 1t log |Σx|, (39)
where ˜Rs(.) is the concave objective function in (27) and
1
t log |Σx| is the logarithmic barrier. As for constraint (28) (per-
antenna power constraint (25) with equality), we also rewrite
it as the following equality constraint
A · vec(Σx) = [ P1 . . . Pnt ]T , (40)
8∇x ft = EH′
[(
(H′)†⊗ (H′)T
)
vec
((
(I+H′Σx(H
′
)†)−1
)T)
−
(
G†⊗GT
)
vec
((
(I+GΣxG†)−1
)T)]
+
1
t
vec
((
Σx−1
)T) (37)
∇2xx ft = EH′
[
− ((H
′
)†⊗ (H
′
)T )
((
I+H
′
Σx(H
′
)†)⊗
(
(I+H
′
Σx(H
′
)†)T
)−1
·Kp
(
((H
′
)†)T ⊗H
′
)
+(G†⊗GT )
((
I+GΣxG†)⊗
(
I+GΣxG†)T
)−1
·Kp
(
(G†)T ⊗G
)]
−
1
t
(Σx⊗ΣTx )−1Kp (38)
where the nt × (nt)2 matrix A has entries being 1 for those
corresponds to {Σx}ii, i = 1 . . .nt , and entries being 0 else, and
the vectorization operator for a matrix vec(.) is defined as [19]
[20]. For example, when nt = 2
A =
[
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
]
.
Now we focus on the detailed steps for the optimization
of ft(Σx) in (39) subject to equality constraint (40). In the
following, the ν is the nt × 1 Lagrange multiplier associated
to equality constraint (40).
1) Initialize Σ(0)x and ν(0)
2) By invoking the matrix calculus [19] [20], compute the
residue as
r =
[
∇x ft +AT ν
A · vec(Σx)− [ P1 . . . Pnt ]T
]
where ∇x means the gradient of function respect to vector
vec(Σx), and ∇x ft is given in (37) with H′ from (9) and
⊗ being the Kronecker product. The direction [∆x,∆ν]T
to update [vec(Σx),ν]T is computed by the KKT matrix
[18] as [
∆x
∆ν
]
=−
[
∇2xx ft AT
A 0
]−1
r,
where ∇2xx ft is explicitly given in (38), with Kp being
the permutation matrix such that vec(AT ) = Kpvec(A) as
defined in [20, (51)].
3) For the n+1 step, we compute
(
vec
(
Σ(n+1)x
)
,ν(n+1)
)
=(
vec
(
Σ(n)x
)
+ s∆x,ν(n)+ s∆ν
)
, where s is the step size
found by the backtracking line search.
4) If the norm of residue ‖r‖2 < ε, increase t by a factor
γ = 1.5 and go to step 5. If not, go back to step 2.
5) Stop when the gap ntt < ε, if not, go back to step 2.
Note that steps 2 to 4 are the infeasible start Newton steps,
and the algorithm will converge since objective function ft (.)
in (39) is concave (both ˜Rs(.) from (27) and the logarithmic
barrier are concave) [18]. And following [18], one can show
that the gap to the optimal value of (26) is ntt as in step
5, because the dimension of Σx in the logarithmic barrier
1
t log |Σx| is nt × nt .
Compared with the algorithm in [12] which also considers
the per-antenna power constraint, our algorithm can guarantee
that the gap to the optimal value is vanishing when t → ∞
while that in [12] can not guarantee such an optimality.
Moreover, [12] requires full CSIT of both legitimate channel
and eavesdropper while our statistical CSIT requirement is
more practical.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide numerical and simulation results
for our theoretical claims in previous sections. In all figures
presented, noise at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
has unit variance each. The SNR is then defined as the total
transmitted power over all antennas in the dB scale. The
ratio of the legitimate channel variance over the eavesdropper
channel variance in (3) is σ2h/σ2g = 4. All channel matrices are
Rayleigh faded.
First, in Fig. 1-4, we show the numerical results for secrecy
capacities C ts under the total power constraints (15) in Theo-
rem 1. In Fig. 1, we compare the MIMOME secrecy capacities
C ts under different combinations of number of antennas. Three
different combinations (nt ,nr,ne) with fixed nt = 4 and nt ≥ nr
are considered, where nt ,nr and ne respectively are the number
of antennas at the transmitter, the legitimate receiver, and
the eavesdropper. Consistent with [11], when nr = ne = 1,
the MISOSE secrecy capacities do not scale with SNR and
converges at high SNR. Same phenomenon also happens even
when nr = ne = 2. Thus it may be a waste of resource by
increasing the SNR for the MIMOME channel with nr = ne.
To overcome this drawback, one can increase nr to make it
larger than ne. These observations meet our results in Corollary
1. Also with fixed number of transmit antennas nt > ne,
increasing the difference nr−ne is very helpful to increase the
secrecy capacities in all SNR regimes. Similarly, as in Fig. 1,
in Fig. 2 we compare the MIMOME secrecy capacities C ts in
Theorem 1 but with fixed nr = 5 and nr ≥ nt . The MISOSE
secrecy capacities with (nt ,nr,ne) = (5,1,1) are also depicted
in Fig 2, and again they do not scale with the SNR. The SNR
scaling in MIMOME channels can be obtained when nr > ne
but not nr = ne. And with fixed nr > ne (but not nr = ne),
increasing the difference nt−ne is very helpful to increase the
secrecy capacities even at medium SNR regimes.
Next, we consider the MIMOME secrecy capacities C ts in
Theorem 1 with single transmit antenna in Fig. 3. As predicted
in Corollary 1, when nt = 1 there will be no SNR scaling
no matter nr > ne or nr = ne. However, one can observe that
channels with larger nr − ne (but not larger nr) will have
higher secrecy capacities C ts . Next, in Fig. 4, we show that
all available transmit power P should be used for MIMOME
channels with total power constraints (15). We plot the Rs(αI)s
in (22), the secrecy rates with channel input matrices Σx =αI.
The maximum allowable transmit power P = 20 dB and
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Fig. 1. Under total power constraints over all transmit antennas (15), the
secrecy capacities versus SNRs with different number of antennas (nt ≥ nr).
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Fig. 2. Under total power constraints over all transmit antennas (15), the
secrecy capacities versus SNRs with different number of antennas (nr ≥ nt ).
0 ≤ α ≤ P/nt . From Fig.4, the secrecy rate Rs(αI) increases
monotonically with α. Thus when α equals to its maximum
P/nt , the secrecy rate Rs(P/ntI) is the secrecy capacity, as in
the proof of Theorem 1.
In Fig. 5 and 6, we studies the wiretap channels under
the per-antenna power constraints (25). In Fig.5, the secrecy
rates of wiretap channels with (nt ,nr,ne) = (2,2,1) (the objec-
tion function of (26) with channel input covariance matrices
Σx = diag(P1,P2)) are compared with the secrecy capacities Cps
of wiretap channels with (nt ,nr,ne) = (2,1,1) (characterized
in Theorem 2). As predicted in Corollary 3, the MISOSE
channels under constraints (25) cannot have SNR scaling.
However, as stated in Corollary 4, the SNR scaling can be
obtained for the wiretap channel with (nt ,nr,ne) = (2,2,1)
even we use the suboptimal Σx to compute the secrecy rate
in Fig.5. In Fig.6, we use the algorithm in Section IV to
numerically solve the secrecy capacity optimization problem
(26) subject to constraint (25), where (nt ,nr,ne) = (2,2,1) and
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Fig. 3. Under total power constraints over all transmit antennas (15), the
secrecy capacities versus SNRs with single transmit antenna (nt = 1).
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Fig. 4. Under total power constraints over all transmit antennas (15), the
MIMOME secrecy rates Rs(αI) in (22) (with channel input matrix Σx = αI)
versus α where 0≤ α≤ P/nt .
ε = 10−4. The SNR is P1 + P2 in dB scale. The proposed
algorithms converge in few iterations. Note that the final
converged values are very close the secrecy rates computed
using channel input covariance matrices Σx = (P1,P2). This
fact implies that the secrecy rates for (nt ,nr,ne) = (2,2,1)
plotted in Fig. 5 are very close to the secrecy capacities under
per-antenna power constraints (25).
Finally, in Fig. 7, we compare C ts and C
p
s , the MISOSE
secrecy capacities under the total power constraints (15) and
per-antenna power constraints (25) in Theorem 1 and 2,
respectively. Since under total power constraints (15), the
transmitters are free to allocate power between transmit an-
tennas, the corresponding secrecy capacities are higher than
those under per-antennas power constraints (25) (C ts ≥ Cps
when P = P1+P2). We also observe that when the ratio P1/P2
are larger, the secrecy capacities Cps become smaller when
(nt ,nr,ne) = (2,1,1). This is due to that the multiple transmit
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Fig. 5. Under per-antenna power constraints (25), secrecy rates of wiretap
channels with (nt ,nr ,ne) = (2,2,1) versus secrecy capacities of wiretap
channels with (nt ,nr ,ne) = (2,1,1).
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Σx=diag(P1,P2),(P1:P2)=(2:1),SNR=5dB
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Fig. 6. Convergence of the proposed iterative algorithms for computing the
secrecy capacities under constraints (25), where (nt ,nr ,ne) = (2,2,1).
antennas act more like a single antenna when P1/P2 is larger.
Similar observations can be obtained from the secrecy rates
under power constraints (25) and (nt ,nr,ne) = (2,2,1) in Fig.
5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, under two different power constraints, the
secrecy capacities in fast fading Rayleigh MIMOME wiretap
channels with only the statistics of CSIT of both the legitimate
and eavesdropper channels were considered. When antennas
of the legitimate receiver were more than (or equal to) those
of the eavesdropper, under the total power constraint, we fully
characterized the MIMOME secrecy capacity. Under the per-
antenna power constraint, we also showed the secrecy capacity
for the MISOSE channel. These results are the first secrecy
capacity results for multiple antenna wiretap channels with
partial CSIT.
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Fig. 7. MISOSE secrecy capacities under the total power constraints (15)
and per-antennas power constraints (25), where (nt ,nr ,ne) = (2,1,1).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
We first focus on Property (I). First, let us consider the case
where Σ2x  Σ1x ≻ 0. We begin our proof by transforming the
objective function in (16) into the upcoming (44). Since H′ in
(9) has the same distribution as H, we rewrite the objective
function in (16) as
EH
[
log
∣∣∣I+H′Σx(H′)†∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+GΣxG†∣∣∣] .
And by the matrix equality |I+AB| = |I +BA|, the above
equation equals to
EH′
[
log
∣∣∣I+Σx(H′)†H′∣∣∣]−EG[log∣∣∣I+ΣxG†G∣∣∣] . (41)
For any Σx ≻ 0, from (9),
EH′
[
log
∣∣∣I+Σx(H′)†H′∣∣∣]
=EH′
[
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+Σx
(
H†(nr−ne)H(nr−ne)+
σ2h
σ2g
G†G
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
.
Substituting the above equalities into (41), it then equals to
EH′
[
log
∣∣∣∣I+(I+ΣxG†G)−1 Σx(( ˜H′)† ˜H′)
∣∣∣∣
]
, (42)
where
( ˜H′)† ˜H′ = H†(nr−ne)H(nr−ne)+
(
σ2h
σ2g
− 1
)
G†G. (43)
Note that since since σ2h ≥ σ2g, the RHS of (43) is positive
semi-definite. And thus we can always find ˜H′ to make (43)
valid [21]. Then we can rewrite (42) as
EH′
[
log
∣∣∣∣I+ ˜H′(Σ−1x +G†G)−1 ( ˜H′)†
∣∣∣∣
]
. (44)
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Now for any Σ2x  Σ1x ≻ 0, we know that(
(Σ2x)−1 +G†G
)−1

(
(Σ1x)−1 +G†G
)−1
≻ 0, and thus
˜H′
(
(Σ2x)−1 +G†G
)−1
( ˜H′)†
 ˜H′
(
(Σ1x)−1 +G†G
)−1
( ˜H′)†
(a)
≻ 0. (45)
Note that the above relationship is valid for every realization
of the random channels, and from [21], we know that
EH′
[
log
∣∣∣∣I+ ˜H′((Σ2x)−1 +G†G)−1 ( ˜H′)†
∣∣∣∣
]
≥EH′
[
log
∣∣∣∣I+ ˜H′((Σ1x)−1 +G†G)−1 ( ˜H′)†
∣∣∣∣
]
.
Thus (23) is valid if Σ2x  Σ1x ≻ 0.
Now we only need to further prove that if Σ2x Σ1x  0, when
Σ1x is singular, Rs(Σ2x) ≥ Rs(Σ1x). Then our claim in Property
(I) is valid. Here we prove the case where both Σ1x and Σ2x
are singular, while the case where only Σ1x is singular can
be proved similarly. First, ∀α > 0, as shown in the previous
paragraph, Rs(Σ2x +αI)−Rs(Σ1x +αI) ≥ 0 when Σ2x  Σ1x  0
since Σ2x +αI Σ1x +αI≻ 0. Next, following methods in [22,
P.3957], we have limα→0 Rs(Σ1x +αI) = Rs(Σ1x) with α > 0.
This fact comes from the continuity of the log det functions
in (22) over positive definite matrices [22]. Then we know
that Rs(Σ2x)−Rs(Σ1x) = limα→0
(
Rs(Σ2x +αI)−Rs(Σ1x +αI)
)
≥
0. This concludes our proof for Property (I). As for Property
(II), it can be easy obtained from (45 a)
B. Proof of Colloray 1
We only prove the case where nt ≥ nr > ne, since the rest
two cases can be proved similarly. From Theorem 1, we know
that the MIMOME secrecy capacity C ts equals to
C ts = EH
[
log
∣∣∣∣I+ Pnt HH†
∣∣∣∣
]
−EG
[
log
∣∣∣∣I+ Pnt GG†
∣∣∣∣
]
From [23], one can transform the previous equation as
C ts = nrE
[
log
(
1+
σ2hP
nt
λ
)]
− neE
[
log
(
1+
σ2gP
nt
λ
)]
,
where λ is an unordered eignvalue of a complex Wishart
matrix with nt degrees of freedom and covariance matrix I.
With the definition Pg = σ2gP,
C ts = nrE
[
log
(
1+
σ2h
σ2g
Pg
nt
λ
)]
− neE
[
log
(
1+
Pg
nt
λ
)]
.
Note that σ2h/σ2g ≥ 1, then
lim
Pg→∞
C ts − nr log(σ2h/σ2g)
logPg
= nr− ne,
for fixed nt .
C. Proof of Proposition 1
Following [22], we can show that the result in Lemma 1
is still valid under (25), with proof based on replacing (25)
with the covariance matrix constraint E(xx†) S. To be more
specific, Cps (P1, . . . ,Pnt ) = maxS∈SCs(S), where C
p
s (P1, . . . ,Pnt )
is the secrecy capacity under per-antenna power constraint
(25), Cs(S) is the secrecy capacity under the covariance matrix
constraint E(xx†)  S, and the set S = {S|{S}ii ≤ Pi, i =
1, . . . ,nt ,S  0}. Next, we can show that Gaussian signal x
without prefixing U ≡ x is still secrecy capacity achieving
with respect to Cs(S). The proof is the same as that of Lemma
1, expect for proving that under covariance matrix constraint
instead of (15), Gaussian x maximizes (14). To prove this fact,
from (18 b), we know that the maximization in (14) equals to
maxx h(σgσh y
′|z,H′). Given a realization of H′ = H′, we can
show that Gaussian x will make (y′,z) jointly Gaussian and
maximize h(σgσh y
′|z,H′ = H′) for all x satisfying E(xx†) = S′
and S′  S, by modifying the proof of [6, Lemma 1] with [14,
Theorem 8.6.5]. Moreover, since x is independent of H′, we
know that Gaussian x will maximize h(σgσh y
′|z,H′) and thus
maximize (14) subject to the E(xx†)  S (thus also for the
per-antenna power constraint (25)).
Substitute the optimal Gaussian x with covariance matrix
Σx into I(x;y|H)− I(x;y|G), we have the secrecy capacity
formulae as (26) subject to (25). Next, by replacing channel
matrix H in (26) with the same distribution one H′ in (9),
we have (27) according to the proof in Appendix A (steps
for reaching (42)). Finally, following the first paragraph of
Theorem 1’s proof, we know that the secrecy capacity (27)
under (25) is concave in Σx.
D. Solution of the optimization problem (32) subject to the
equality constraint (31)
In this appendix, we show that subject to constraint (31),
the optimization problem (32) has optimal solution (29). We
only consider the case with β < 0 because β = 0 is a trivial
case. The following proof is given by mathematical induction,
which shows that the off-diagonal terms of Σx subject to (31)
should be zeros.
(i) Let us first consider the case with nt = 2. By defining
f (x) , log(1 + x) to simplify the notations, the objective
function of (32) can be written as
Eg
[
f
( β
σ+|g1|2{Σx}11+|g2|2{Σx}22+g∗1{Σx}12g2+g∗2{Σx}21g1
)]
.
(46)
Notice that, since g1 and g2 are independent zero-mean
Gaussian, the expectation of (46) over g = [g1 g2]T would not
change by replacing g1 with −g1. Therefore, with {Σx}11 = P1
12
and {Σx}22 = P2, the expectation in (46) can be written as
Eg
[
f
( β
σ+|g1|2P1+|g2|2P2+g∗1{Σx}12g2+g∗2{Σx}21g1
)]
=
1
2
{
Eg
[
f
( β
σ+|g1|2P1+|g2|2P2+2Re{g∗1{Σx}12g2}
)]
+Eg
[
f
( β
σ+|g1|2P1+|g2|2P2−2Re{g∗1{Σx}12g2}
)]}
=
1
2
Eg
[
f
(
β[β+ 2σ+2(|g1|2P1+|g2|2P2)]
(σ+|g1|2P1+|g2|2P2)2−(2Re{g∗1{Σx}12g2})
2
)]
.
In this case, the expectation is maximized by choosing
{Σx}12 = {Σx}∗21 = 0
since β < 0 and β+ 2σ > 0. Hence, subject to (31), (32) is
maximized by choosing Σx = diag(P1,P2), for the case with
nt = 2.
(ii) Suppose that the statement holds for nt = k, where k≥ 2.
We need to show that it also holds for nt = k + 1. Specif-
ically, for nt = k + 1, with eavesdropper channel being g =
[g1, . . . ,gk+1]T , the objective function Eg
[
log
(
1+ β
σ+g†Σxg
)]
in (32) can be written as
Eg

log

1+ β
σ+
k+1
∑
i=1
k+1
∑
j=1
g∗i {Σx}i jg j




= Eg

log

1+ β
σk+1+2Re{
k
∑
i=1
g∗i {Σx}i,k+1gk+1}



 , (47)
where
σk+1 , σ+ g˜† ˜Σxg˜+ |gk+1|2Pk+1,
with g˜ = [g1, . . . ,gk]T and ˜Σx being a k × k matrix with
{ ˜Σx}i, j = {Σx}i, j, for i, j = 1, . . . ,k. Then, by the fact that
−gk+1 has the same distribution as gk+1, the expectation in
(47) becomes
1
2
Eg
[
log
(
1+
β(β+2σ+ 2(g˜† ˜Σxg˜+ |gk+1|2Pk+1))
(σk+1)2− (2Re{∑ki=1g∗i {Σx}i,k+1gk+1})2
)]
.
Here, the expectation is maximized by choosing
{Σx}i,k+1 = {Σx}∗k+1,i = 0
for i = 1, . . . ,k, due to the assumptions β < 0 and β+2σ > 0.
In this case, (47) becomes
Eg
[
log
(
1+
β
σ+ |gk+1|2Pk+1 + g˜† ˜Σxg˜
)]
. (48)
Then because σ+ |gk+1|2Pk+1 ≥ 0, β+2(σ+ |gk+1|2Pk+1)> 0,
and ˜Σx is positive semi-definite, it follows from the induc-
tive hypothesis that (48) is maximized by choosing ˜Σx =
diag(P1, . . . ,Pk). This concludes that subject to the equality
constraint (31), the optimal solution maximizing the objective
function of (32) is (29).
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